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Abstract
This paper analyzes the bank lending channel and the heterogeneous effects
on the euro area, providing evidence that the channel is indeed working.
The analysis of the transmission mechanism is based on structural impulse
responses to an unconventional monetary policy shock on bank loans. The
Bank Lending Survey (BLS) is exploited in order to get insights on develop-
ments of loan demand and supply. The contribution of this paper is to use
country-specific data to analyze the consequences of unconventional mone-
tary policy, instead of taking an aggregate stance by using euro area data.
This approach provides a deeper understanding of the bank lending channel
and its effects. That is, an expansionary monetary policy shock leads to an
increase in loan demand, supply and output growth. A small north-south-
disparity between the countries can be observed.
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1 Introduction
The last years have been turbulent times for the European Central Bank
(ECB) and the other European national banks. Starting with aggravated
financial conditions due to the emerging US sub-prime crisis in August 2007,
which was followed by the collapse of Lehman Brothers on the 15th Septem-
ber 2008 and the global financial crisis that unfolded after it.
The negative impact of the crisis on the banking system culminated in
extraordinary measures banks have taken in the upcoming weeks and months
after the collapse. Loan policies have been revamped and loan conditions
have been tightened to stabilize balance sheets.
The first shocks to the financial system have been followed by increasingly
nervous markets anticipating a Greek sovereign default in early 2010, with a
risk of contagion to other European countries. As the sovereign debt crisis
hit Italy and Spain in mid 2011, the euro area banking system faced serious
problems regarding tumbling balance sheets and a dried-up interbank market
(Cour-Thimann & Winkler, 2013). The close link between financial and
non-financial markets led to real effects on the European economy. GDP
growth in the euro area slowed down by 3.8%1 during the first years of the
crisis compared to the growth level of 2007. This comes at no surprise, as
lending from banks accounts for up to 85% of the sources of external finance
to corporations and households. Hence, the tightened loan supply had a
negative second round effect on output growth (ECB, 2009).
When transmission channels of conventional monetary instruments are
impaired by market stress, the use of unconventional policies can help open up
new channels to stimulate bank lending and thus output (Albertazzi, Nobili,
Signoretti, et al., 2016). In early 2008, the first enhanced credit support
policies have been issued, which were designed to provide more liquidity to
banks in an easier fashion. The policies included fixed-rate full allotment,
giving banks unlimited access to central bank liquidity, extended maturities
on liquidity provisions and the extension of eligible collaterals. Additionally,
several long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) had been released with
a maturity date ranging between 6 to 48 months. Those helped banks to
stabilize their balance sheets in the short-term and strengthen their liquidity
position in the long-term. As bank liquidity is not the only concern of the
ECB, an asset purchase program has been launched to further boost economic
activity and drive up inflation via increased capital flows at the zero lower
bound (Trichet, 2009).
1Average calculated for the sample countries in this paper. Values for the GDP growth
taken from OECD (2015).
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Even though the ECB deployed many non-standard measures to counter
the negative effects on the financial system, this paper focuses on policies
which had a direct effect on banks and the provision of loans. It is thus
consistent with the goals of the ECB “[...] to maintain the availability of
credit for households and companies at accessible rates” (Trichet, 2009, p.
12). In times where financial frictions are increased, i.e. the financial crisis
from 2008 onward, the availability of loans is decreased due to more stringent
terms and conditions. The scientific literature has already shown that in
such times, (unconventional) monetary policy has a higher impact on GDP
through the credit channel, as excess liquidity helps banks to soften their
lending conditions (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995; Kashyap & Stein, 2000).
Concluding the outline, the research questions can be formulated as fol-
lows: How effective was the ECB with their liquidity providing policies? Was
the bank-lending channel operational during the crisis? If yes, what are the
different heterogeneous country-level effects of these euro-wide policies on
loan demand and supply?
In order to identify the credit channel, the paper makes use of the Bank
Lending Survey (BLS) from the ECB to get an insight into the demand
and supply of loans from and to enterprises. In contrast to the majority of
scientific literature on this topic, which investigates the aggregate effects, this
paper investigates the country-level impulse response functions in order to
get a deeper understanding of the heterogeneous effects of a unified monetary
policy shock. In order to do so, a vector autoregressive (VAR) model is
deployed which will be estimated by Bayesian methods.
The findings of this paper show a clear indication of country-specific ef-
fects from an unconventional monetary policy shock. Following such a shock,
the loan supply condition loosens up for around 3% for several months. How-
ever, Germany, Greece and Italy show an apprehensive behavior regarding
their lending conditions as the responses are delayed for 5-6 months. A sim-
ilar delay can be observed for five out of seven countries for the development
of loan demand, for which the median peaks at 2% to 3%. In situations
where interest levels are low, investments indeed react slowly and this could
be correlated to the delayed credit demand responses (Praet, 2017). The ef-
fects on GDP growth reveal that the broad credit channel is indeed working,
even though the transmission channels are impaired. These findings show a
clearer north-south-disparity as Austria, Belgium, Germany and Italy show
significant positive responses and Greece, Portugal and Spain show small or
no effects.
In order to test the robustness of the findings, a wide variety of checks
will be deployed. First, the lag length will be extended from two to three
and four lags. Second, the Cholesky ordering will be changed in a way that
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the two loan variables will be ordered below the shock variable. This would
indicate that loan demand and supply would react within the same month
as the monetary policy shock is deployed, and that the ECB does not base
their policy decisions on the latest Bank Lending Survey. Third, the shock
variable will be changed to the spread between the main refinancing opera-
tions (MRO) and Euro OverNight Index Average (EONIA) rate as proposed
by Albertazzi et al. (2016) and Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010). The au-
thors show that the spread is correlated with the excess liquidity of the ECB
and thus should be even more useful in capturing credit enhancing policies.
Overall, the results of those tests confirm the findings of the base model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section
provides a short review of the literature. Section 3 introduces the data, some
descriptive analysis and the methodology. Section 4 presents the results.
Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
This section presents a short overview of the three main topics discussed in
this paper. We start with an explanation of the basic banking channels at
work between the monetary policy of the ECB and the banks. Subsequently,
a brief outline of the ECB’s monetary policy course from 2008 onward is
given. Finally, other papers analyzing the effects of monetary policy on the
development of loans, especially with the usage of the BLS, are presented.
The broad credit channel, as hypothesized first by Bernanke and Blinder
(1988) and later on formulated in detail by Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and
Kashyap and Stein (2000), arises due to frictions within the financial system.
More precisely, it refers to the role of financial institutions to transmit mon-
etary policy to the economy via loans and other financial products. Such
frictions could be asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers or
a severe disturbance in the market. Both scenarios would lead monetary
financial institutions to act less risky and retain their liquidity instead of
investing in other risky products or handing out loans to non-financial cor-
porations and households. This leads to a situation where banks and the rest
of the real economy is short on liquidity and thus investment can be ham-
pered. However, the credit channel is not a transmission channel on its own,
but a amplification of the effects of monetary policy. In theory, central banks
indirectly effect the external finance premium of banks which is defined by
the difference in costs of the generation of external and internal funds. This
effect can be split up in two sub-channels: the balance sheet channel and the
narrow credit channel.
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The balance sheet channel stems from the fact that a strong financial
position, in the form of liquid assets or valuable illiquid assets like real estates,
can help to reduce the conflicts between lender and borrower. Hence, the
balance sheet of a corporation and its fluctuations influence the external
financial premium. A negative monetary policy shock influences the balance
sheet via increased interest expenses on debts and declining asset prices.
The more interesting channel for this paper is the narrow credit channel.
This channels represents the more direct effects of the broad credit channel,
such that monetary policy influences the supply of loans via in- or decreased
liquidity supply. In a rather straightforward mechanism, banks can overcome
the frictions of a dysfunctional market by lending money from central banks.
As Allen, Chui, and Maddaloni (2004) show, financial institutions are impor-
tant for the provision of loans in the euro area. Thus a reduction of possible
credit supply by financial institutions incurs costs on the borrowers as they
have to search for new sources of liquidity.
More recently, De Nicolò, Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Valencia (2010) pro-
posed a third credit channel in the form of increased risk taking by banks
due to the low interest rate environment. Their observations are based on
the fact that banks reallocate their balance sheets from safe to risky assets
to gain higher yields. Even though this channel has no direct effect on bank
lending, the risk appetite of financial intermediaries has a positive impact on
the overall credit supply (Naceur & Roulet, 2017).
A credit enhancing monetary policy helps banks to acquire money in the
market more easily. With more liquidity flowing in and a strong balance
sheet, banks can act more venturesome and soften their loan terms and con-
ditions. Through this mechanism, real economic activity and thus inflation
can be boosted.
Now one could ask the question if the ECB followed the theory and de-
ployed such enhanced credit support policies. Looking at the course of the
European central bank’s monetary policy actions, we can see that indeed the
measures have been liquidity providing and thus credit enhancing. This fact
comes at no surprise as the ECB always stated that the provision of credits
to households and corporations is one of the main priorities (Trichet, 2009).
The implemented policies are all well-tailored for the bank-centered financial
system of Europe (Cour-Thimann & Winkler, 2013). Comparing the actions
taken by the ECB, the FED, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan
after the eruption of the crisis, Fawley, Neely, et al. (2013) conclude that the
European monetary policies can be considered "pure" (p. 55) quantitative
easing as they target central bank reserves and allow for a wide range of
collaterals.
One of the first policies seen after the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers
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was the change from variable-rate tenders with a bidding process to fixed-rate
tenders and full-allotment (FRFA) for all future lending operations.2 Which
means that banks could now lend as much as they want from the ECB at
the main refinancing operations rate. At the same time, the ECB started to
widen the range of possible collaterals for the lending activities of the banks.
Thereby banks could refinance more illiquid assets in their balance sheets.
This combination helped banks to access short-term liquidity to relief the
stress of their balance sheets. On the side of conventional monetary policy,
the main interest rate was cut by 50 basis points from 4.25% to 3.75% in
October 2008 and was since then slowly lowered to the zero lower bound,
which was hit on the 16th of March, 2016.
Now that short-term liquidity was secured, the Governing Council of the
ECB turned towards the medium- and long-term lending. The conventional
longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) have a maturity of 2 weeks to
3 months. Early in 2008, the maturity has been increased to 6 months,
with several operations being carried out between 2008 and 2011. From 2009
onward till 2011, four 12-month refinancing operations have been carried out.
With the sovereign debt crisis hitting the financial system in the fall of 2011,
the ECB pushed the maturity for the upcoming LTROs to 36 months.3 Those
two 3-year operations allotted around €1 trillion in total into the system.
In 2014 and 2016, targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs),
with a maturity of 48 months, had been issued. The amount banks could
borrow were linked to the amount of lending to non-financial corporations
and households each bank had in its books. The second round of the TLTROs
had a new implementation of linked interest rates to the lending pattern of
banks. The more loans a bank would issue for investments or consumer
credit, the more attractive the interest rate for the lending operation would
become. With this new setup, the ECB tried to direct the flow of funds
directly to the real economy, as banks could have the incentive to take the
excess liquidity and invest into high-risk products boosting their revenue and
not the economy. All those extensions did not only keep money market rates
low, but also strengthen the position of the ECB as intermediary between the
banks and the money market, which clearly helped the financial institutions
to strengthen their overall condition.
As already mentioned, this paper focuses on the credit enhancing poli-
cies. Hence, programs such as the currency swap agreements, the Outright
2A detailed summary of the actions taken by the ECB can be seen in Fawley, Neely,
et al. (2013), Fratzscher, Duca, and Straub (2014) and Cour-Thimann and Winkler (2013).
This section presents the most prominent points out of those papers to give a summarizing
overview.
3Also known as very longer-term refinancing operations (VLTROs)
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Monetary Transactions (OMT) or the Securities Markets Programme (SMP),
which where set in place to relief tensions in certain markets that impaired
the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy actions, or the covered
bond purchase programme (CBPP), aimed at boosting economic activity and
inflation, are not covered.
After setting up the theoretical background between the monetary policy
transmission channels and the actual monetary policies, the question arises
how to identify the channels and the actions taken. In order to properly
identify the narrow credit channel, a database is needed that provides in-
formation on the supply and demand of bank loans. Before 2003 this gap
could not be filled in a satisfying way, but since then, the ECB conducted
the Bank Lending Survey with detailed questions for banks in the euro area
and thereby asses the lending situation. The second problem arises from
the question how to quantify the credit enhancing policies. The scientific
community came to the conclusion that the Euro OverNight Index Average
(EONIA) rate would be a credible tool for assessing the monetary policies of
the ECB.4
Looking at related literature, Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, and Peydró (2013)
investigate the heterogeneous effects of a monetary policy shock on countries
which are under sovereign stress and other eurozone countries.5 For the
identification process, they rely on the answers from the BLS and the EONIA
rate as shock parameter. Their results point out that the liquidity provision
of the ECB has helped the distressed countries to loosen their loan standards,
thereby increasing the amount of loans supplied by banks and hence increase
the GDP growth significantly. The paper by Couaillier (2015) focuses on
the effects of conventional and unconventional monetary policy on the terms
and conditions of loan contracts. He also relies on the Bank Lending Survey
and a bayesian approach to overcome the short sample of the survey. The
findings show that a increase in a monetary policy rate, here the deposit
facility rate, has an negative impact on the terms and conditions and thus
on the credit supply. Darracq-Paries and De Santis (2015) use the BLS
in a new way to identify the impact of the 3-year LTROs. The authors
conclude with their VAR analysis that the longer-term refinancing operation
had an positive impact in the short to medium term on GPD, inflation and
loan supply to enterprises. Additionally, the LTROs helped banks to lower
their leverage and to increase their liquidity and capital buffers. Ozsahin
4A more detailed explanation of the BLS and the EONIA rate can be found in sec-
tion 3.1.
5The group of countries under stress is composed of Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal
and Spain. The other eurozone countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands
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(2016) focuses his research on the characteristics and condition of banks and
how those influence the transmission of monetary policy on output. The
identification of the credit variables is also based on the BLS and identical
to Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, and Peydró (2015). The author argues that stricter
bank regulation, in terms of bank capitalization and stable funding base,
has a positive effect on the transmission of monetary policy through the
bank lending channel. The last paper to mention is from Boeckx, Dossche,
and Peersman (2017). The authors also use the BLS to identify demand
and supply of loans, but do not model a pure monetary policy shock and
instead construct a balance sheet shock. For the shock only the balance
sheet exposure to the banking system is used, as this relates to volume of
credit to the non-financial corporations and households. Thereby capturing
all actions taken by the ECB such as the longer-term refinancing operations
and the covered bond purchase program. Boeckx et al. (2017) conclude that
an expanding balance sheet has a positive effect on GDP growth, prices and
lending.
3 Data and Methodology
The research focuses on the heterogeneous effects of an unconventional mone-
tary policy shock on loan demand and supply. In order to gain useful insights
from the Bayesian VAR model, one needs to carefully identify the shock of
interest, which isolates the liquidity providing measures of the ECB into one
variable. The possible candidates and alternatives for the robustness checks
are described below. The sample consists out for seven countries, namely
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The limita-
tion to those countries comes from the Bank Lending Survey, as countries
can report their surveys in different indices. Those indices, however, are not
comparable to each other. The usage of the net percentage index thus yields
the biggest country sample. Furthermore, these countries report data within
the same time span.
3.1 Variable choice
The variables can be grouped into three thematic blocks, which will be dis-
cussed thoroughly below. The monetary policy block is used to control for
the shock, but also to approximate central bank behavior. The Bank Lending
Survey block consits of the survey indicators regarding the development of
loans in the euro area. The third block captures the generel macroeconomic
setting. The data spans from January, 2008 to March, 2017. In order to in-
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crease the number of observations the model uses monthly data points. This
yielded the problem that GDP growth, loan demand and loan supply had to
be interpolated from a quarterly to a monthly time frame. The interpolation
itself is described in the respective sections below.
Monetary policy block
The ECB makes use of three different interest rates to display its stance
on monetary policy. The marginal lending facility (MLF) rate and the de-
posit facility (DF) rate are important for the access to overnight liquidity for
banks. Those two indicators represent the ceiling and the floor for the most
prominent monetary policy indicator, the main refinancing operations rate,
at which banks can lend money from the ECB for one week. In figure 1,
the MLF-DF corridor is plotted between 2008 and 2017. A major downward
shift can be seen between the end of 2008 and the middle of 2009, pushing
the MRO rate to 1%. The (near) zero lower bound was targeted from 2014
onwards. All these decisions are based on the provision of easy liquidity
to monetary financial institutions and at the same time prevent them from
gaining interest income via deposits at the ECB.
The most common interest rate to control for unconventional monetary
policy is the Euro OverNight Index Average (EONIA) rate (Ciccarelli et
al., 2013). It is the weighted average over all overnight interbank lending
operations between 28 panel banks (ECB, 2018). Hence, by definition the
EONIA rate also moves in the corridor between the MLF and DF rate. Until
the start of the crisis, the overnight index rate was seemingly identical to
the MRO rate. This fact changed with the start of the liquidity providing
operations of the ECB and thus the EONIA rate dropped below the MRO
rate. ECB’s Governing Council used the deposits facility rate to drag the
EONIA more to the floor, such that the monetary policy decisions could be
properly transmitted to the financial system (Trichet, 2009).
However, there are other authors which argue that the spread between the
MRO and the EONIA rate would be the better way to capture the liquidity
providing measures.6 They show that unconventional monetary policy can
trigger a liquidity effect which drives a wedge between the MRO and EONIA
rate. Further, this indicator is correlated with excess liquidity of the central
banks in the euro area during their longer-term refinancing operations. How-
ever, the spread will not be included in the base model, but it will be used
as shock variable in one of the robustness checks.
6See Albertazzi et al. (2016), Boeckx et al. (2017) and Lenza et al. (2010)
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Fig. 1 Monetary Policy Rates of the ECB. Note: The dark blue dotted line represent the marginal lending
facility (MLF) rate at which banks can obtain overnight liquidity and the light blue dotted line represents
the deposit facility (DF) rate at which counterparties can deposit money at the central bank. Those two
lines make up a corridor for the main policy rate of the ECB, the main refinancing operations (MRO)
rate, here drawn as the solid green line and for the Euro OverNight Index Average (EONIA) rate which
is the weighted average over all overnight interbank lending operations, here drawn as the solid red line.
Bank Lending Survey block
The Bank Lending Survey is carried out quarterly by the ECB and pro-
vides information on the lending situation of banks in the euro area. The
senior loan officers of 140 sample banks from 19 countries are asked about
their opinion on questions related to the terms and conditions of their loan
contracts, developments of loan demand or the change of lending standards
(Köhler Ulbrich, Hempell, & Scopel, 2016). All questions are asked backward
looking for the last quarter and forward looking for the upcoming quarter.
This paper uses the backward looking questions as they resemble the actual
lending situation and not a prediction of it.
The possible answers to the survey range from "eased considerably" to
"tightened considerably" or "increased considerably" to "decreased consider-
ably" and are thus qualitative answers. The BLS database provides multiple
transformations, however, as many other scientific papers, this paper too fol-
lows Lown and Morgan (2006) by using the BLS variables as net percentages.
These values are calculated from the percentage difference of all banks per
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country reporting a positive and vice versa a negative development.
The number of chosen countries depends on the availability of data re-
garding the BLS. Even though 19 countries take part in the survey, not
all report their results with the same definitions or in the same time span.
Thus the resulting list of countries shrinks to seven in total, namely Austria,
Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
For the analysis, the paper makes use of two main questions from the sur-
vey, i.e. "Over the past three months, how have your bank’s credit standards
as applied to the approval of loans or credit lines to enterprises changed?"
which represents the development of loan supply and "Over the past three
months [. . . ] how has the demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises
changed at your bank?" which represents the development of loan demand.
As the time frame is limited, the variables are only for the loan situation
against non-financial corporations.7
Figure 2 depicts the developments of loan demand and supply on country
level. One can see that the changes in the variables are highly heterogeneous
across the countries. There are time periods where the indicators yield a
zero percentage change. This could be due to the fact that the aggregation
method used by the ECB could have sterilizing effects on the developments.
As the BLS does not report the bank-specific answers to the survey, a coun-
try could be split fifty/fifty between loosening (increasing) and tightening
(decreasing) loan developments. Normally, the BLS gathers information on
the loan supply condition in such a way that an increase in the data would
mean harsher loan condition and less supply. In order to give a more com-
prehensible picture, the data is inverted. As De Bondt, Maddaloni, Peydró,
and Scopel (2010) or Del Giovane, Eramo, and Nobili (2011) have shown, the
usage of questions concerning the credit standards is a legitimate instrument
to capture the credit availability in the euro area. A contractive shift, in
both the supply and demand curve of bank lending, will lead to a reduction
of total credit volume. The strength of each shift decides the resulting loan
interest rate (ECB, 2009). Therefore, this paper uses both loan demand and
supply in the model as both variables are important in explaining the lending
situation in the euro area.
Both BLS variables are interpolated to get from a quarterly to a monthly
time frame. The cubic spline method is used as there is no clear indicator to
proxy the development of credit demand or supply.8
7The BLS also includes information on households and mortgages.
8A Chow-Lin based interpolation as in Peersman (2011) cannot be conducted as the
development of the index on the adjusted loans to euro area non-financial corporations
does not correlate with the BLS data on loan supply.
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Fig. 2 Time series of enterprise credit variables for all available countries. Note: The solid red line
represents the loan demand taken from the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) as reported by the local loan
officers for the last three months. The solid blue line is the loan supply also taken from the BLS for the
last three months. Normally, the supply is reported as the tightening of credit standards. In order to give a
more coherent picture, the loan supply is inverted, such that an a positive value on the chart represents an
increase in credit supply. Both values are reported in net percentages, which is the percentage difference
between banks reporting in overall increase to those banks reporting an overall decrease in loan demand
(supply).
Macroeconomic block
This block includes macroeconomic control variables of different forms. Nearly
every variable in this block is available on the country level, which means
that they capture different heterogeneous effects. Output growth and prices
control for the general macroeconomic situation in each country. Jiménez
and Ongena (2012) show that "[...] under tighter macro conditions [..] a
capital crunch begets a credit crunch." (p. 2303). The period of the finan-
cial crisis can clearly be seen as a tighter macro condition, which in turn is
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captured by a dropping GDP growth. It is taken from Eurostat at market
prices, seasonally adjusted and included in terms of the quarter-on-quarter
growth rate. Since GDP is not available on a monthly basis, a Chow-Lin
interpolation is applied with industrial production serving as proxy.
The ECB uses the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for their
inflation goals. However, the consumer price index including energy prices
is driven by rising (sinking) commodity prices, i.e. oil prices. Especially the
consumer prices for liquid fuels are directly linked to oil and make up nearly
the half of the energy component of the HICP (ECB, 2016). Thus, this
paper follows Couaillier (2015) and uses the core HICP excluding energy and
unprocessed foods as monthly rate of change. Thereby avoiding an upwards
(downward) bias and getting closer to the more broader inflation rate of the
GDP deflator (Alcidi, Busse, & Gros, 2016).
The Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) reveals turmoil in the
financial markets and systemic risk. It is taken from the ECB’s statistical
data warehouse and developed by Hollo, Kremer, and Lo Duca (2012). It
is composed of money market, bond market, equity market, financial inter-
mediaries and foreign exchange market indicators. As Boeckx et al. (2017)
points out, the indicator is helpful in explaining monetary policy decision
based on financial stress and uncertainty.
After the macroeconomic and financial control variables, the heteroge-
neous banking system also needs control variables. For this approach, the
paper follows Ciccarelli et al. (2013) and includes two control variables.9
First, the long-term government bond yields which proxy for the respective
country risk. Second, the interbank liquidity to account for the stability of
bank funding which does not rely on ECB money. However, the transaction
volumes are not publicly available and are thus proxied by the deposit lia-
bilities vis-a-vis euro area monetary financial institutions (MFI). A bank’s
deposit from other banks must come from the interbank market and can does
be seen as interbank transaction volumes.
The last variable in this block is the Euro Stoxx 50 index, which covers
the development of the 50 biggest publicly traded companies in the Eurozone.
3.2 Econometric Model
The econometric model adopted is a vector autoregressive (VAR) model and
follows the specification in Huber and Feldkircher (2017). In regression form,
9Ciccarelli et al. (2013) actually uses three variables to capture the heterogeneous ef-
fects. However, long-term liquidity provided by the Eurosystem to the banking sector on
a country-level could not be obtained from a public database.
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the VAR model is given by,
Yt = AXt + t, for t = 1, . . . , T, (1)
where Yt is am-dimensional vector of endogenous variables, A = (A1, . . . , Ap)
is a m×mp-dimensional coefficient matrix, where p denotes the lags,10 Xt =
(Yt−1, . . . , Yt−p) is a mp-dimensional vector of lagged endogenous variables
and t is a normally distributed error term with zero mean and a variance-
covariance matrix Σt, such that,
Σt = H
−1S(H−1)′ (2)
H−1 denotes a lower triangular matrix with unit diagonal and S =
diag(s1, ..., sm) is a diagonal matrix of variances.
The used time frame starts with the first month of 2008 and spans till
the third month of 2017 resulting in t = 111 time points. As described
in section 3.1, the Yt vector is composed of the MRO rate, EONIA rate,
loan demand, loan supply, GDP growth, HICP index, CISS indicator, long-
term government bond yields, MFI deposits and Euro Stoxx 50 index. This
yields 52 euro area and country-specific variables. Thus the total number of
autoregressive parameter k = m(mp) exceeds the number of time points t,
which calls for a Bayesian estimation approach.
The hierarchical prior specification follows Huber and Feldkircher (2017),
which relies on a normal-gamma shrinkage prior. In order to handle the large
number of parameters, Huber and Feldkircher (2017) impose a Gaussian prior
on each coefficient α = vec(A), such that,
αi|ψi ∼ N (0, 2/λ2ψψi), ψi ∼ G(ϑψ, ϑψ), i = 1, . . . , k. (3)
This prior setup has the handy feature of using a lag-specific global shrinkage
parameter λ2ψj for j = 1, . . . , p, such that,
λ2ψi =
p∏
j=1
ζj, ζj ∼ G(dj, lj), (4)
which pushes all elements in the coefficient matrix, and especially the co-
efficients with higher lags, strongly towards zero. Additionally, the prior
includes a local shrinkage parameter ψi that allows for non-zero coefficients
even with a strong global shrinkage parameter. The mean and the variance
of ψi’s gamma distribution ϑψ is a hyperparameter chosen by the researcher.
10For the base model two lags as proposed in Ciccarelli et al. (2015) are used.
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As the authors describe in their paper, a small ϑψ places more mass on the
zero mean of αi|ψi while the tails become heavier. Thus, such a hyperparam-
eter setup would still provide enough flexibility for the model to make use of
the data characteristics.
The actual estimation of the econometric model is achieved by a Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm described in Huber and Feldkircher
(2017).
3.3 Identification
As already mentioned, the aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of an
unconventional monetary policy shock on loan demand and supply and, as a
second round effect, on output and inflation. In order to identify the shock in
the VAR model a Cholesky decomposition with a specific variable ordering is
employed. As the ordering of the variables is crucial for structural inference,
this paper draws from the ECB’s two-pillar approach on monetary policy
strategy and therein especially the second pillar. With the maintenance of
price stability as primary objective, this pillar evoles around an assesment of
the economic and finacial conditions and their effect on prices. The analysis of
those indicators serves as guidance for upcoming monetary policy decisions
(ECB, 2000). For the Cholesky ordering, this implies that prices, output
growth, the financial stress indicator and both, loan demand and supply, are
ordered before the shock variable.11 Every quantity above the policy variable
does not change contemporaneously with the shock. This paper also includes
the main refinancing operations rate before the shock in order to capture the
zero lower bound. After the EONIA rate, the fast moving variables are placed
in the following order: long-term government bond yields, the MFI deposits
and the Euro Stoxx 50 index. Especially the MFI deposits, which capture
the heterogeneous interbank funding situation, are expected to influence the
demand for ECB liquidity and thus the main policy rate.
Hence, the 52 variables in Yt are in the following order: HICP index, GDP
growth, CISS indicator, loan demand, loan supply, MRO rate, EONIA rate,
long-term government bond yields, MFI deposits and Euro Stoxx 50 index.12
11Placing loan supply before demand has virtually no effect on the results.
12All variables are for the full country sample except the MRO rate, EONIA rate and
the Euro Stoxx 50 indicator.
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4 Impact of Credit Support Policies
All impacts reported in this section are normalized by the size of the shock
and scaled to 25 basis points. The normalization alters the y-axis to be in
percentage points and makes the plots comparable. The shock is inverted
to resemble a expansionary monetary policy decision, which means that the
EONIA rate decreases. Each plot displays the median response along the grey
shaded area which represents the 16th and 84th Bayesian credible interval.
Figure 3 shows the responses of loan supply. In theory, a negative shift
in the policy variable should lead to more loan supply. Indeed, the general
picture shows positive responses to the shock. Thus, one could infer that
the supply conditions are loosened. However, a very heterogeneous picture
between the countries arises. Austria and Spain show a instantaneous and
strong effect, where the median peaks around 6% and 3% increases in credit
supply, respectively. Both displaying long effects up to 14 months. Germany,
Greece and Italy also exhibit also a positive effect between 2%-4%, but the
response is delayed by about 5-6 months and dies out at around 13 months.
The delayed effect can be explained by the cyclical behavior of credit supply,
which could be stronger in the mentioned countries (Giannone, Lenza, &
Reichlin, 2009). In the case of Belgium, there is limited evidence regarding
a positive effect on loan supply. Portugal displays no significant response
at all. Looking at the supranational level, there is no clear center-periphery
relationship displayed in figure 3. It thus looks like Germany, Greece and
Italy have been more apprehensive regarding their lending conditions.
Figure 4 displays the findings on loan demand reactions with respect to
an expansionary monetary policy shock. Similar to loan supply, the theory
predicts a positive response to a negative shock. The overall effects are small,
but still positive. In fact, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece and Spain
show a similar pattern of a positive response with around 5 to 7 months
delay. The median response peaks at 2% to 3% credit demand increase
and dies out between 11 to 14 months. Such a behavior is also mentioned
by Praet (2017), who explains that investments indeed react slowly to low
interest rates, but that the ECB’s monetary policy is helping in boosting
investment. As most investments are financed by loans, the demand for it
too reacts slowly to low interest rates. The outliers are Portugal and Italy
with no significant reaction at all. As with loan supply, there is no clear
north-south-disparity between the countries.
The third result is displayed in figure 5 and reports the impact on GDP
growth. The overall picture is inline with the theory of the broad credit
channel and with the literature (Boeckx et al., 2017; Ciccarelli et al., 2013).
Increased credit support policies elevate GDP growth after a few months
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Fig. 3 Impulse Responses of Loan Supply to an EONIA Shock. Note: The chart plots the responses of loans
supply to a expansionary 25 basis point monetary policy shock in the form of a decrease of the EONIA
rate. The responses are divided by the shock itself and thus normalized, which yields a percentage point
representation on the y-axis. The solid blue line represents the median response along the grey shaded
area which covers the Bayesian credible interval between the 16th and 84th quantile. The x-axis steps are
monthly.
delay. In particular, Austria, Belgium, Germany and Italy show a signifi-
cant increase with the median response peaking between 0.1% and 0.2% and
the effect dying out at around 12 to 15 month. Spain and Portugal display
only limited evidence on a positive effect, whereas Greece’s response of GDP
growth is not significant at all. The findings not only show a working bank
lending channel, but also a north-south-disparity. This could be due to ad-
ditional investment incentives and a general stronger economy in the north.
This assumption is inline with Boeckx et al. (2017) findings that retail banks
in the periphery are constrained by their financial fragility. Even though Italy
cannot be considered a financially sound country, the degree of bank market
concentration could be the driver of the positive effect of output. The large
number of small mutual savings banks amplify the effect of the bank lending
channel as those intermediaries are more prone to changes in their costs of
funding (De Santis & Surico, 2013). More recently, Burriel and Galesi (2018)
assert these findings on the north-south-disparity by concluding that the ef-
fect of an unconventional monetary policy shock on output depends on the
resilience of the banking sector.13
13All other results - HICP, CISS, government bond yields, MFI deposits, MRO and Euro
Stoxx - can be found in the appendix, figure 7 - 11.
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Fig. 4 Impulse Responses of Loan Demand to an EONIA Shock. Note: The chart plots the responses
of loans demand to a expansionary 25 basis point monetary policy shock in the form of a decrease of
the EONIA rate. The responses are divided by the shock itself and thus normalized, which yields a
percentage point representation on the y-axis. The solid blue line represents the median response along
the grey shaded area which covers the Bayesian credible interval between the 16th and 84th quantile. The
x-axis steps are monthly.
4.1 Robustness Checks
Figure 6 displays the median impulse responses of all variables for a set of
alternative specifications alongside the credible intervals of the base model.
Thus, the reader can compare the performance and its statistical signifi-
cance.14
The first two tests change the number of chosen lags to three and four
respectively. The model with three lags yields loan effects which would have
been a bit lower compared to the base model, however, the GDP growth
response would have been more pronounced. Nearly the same holds for the
model with four lags. The effect on the responses with different lags can
clearly be seen when comparing the response of loan demand from the base
model to the four lag model. The effect is shifted to the right. However,
this paper uses two lags as a standard choice since the other two models are
less stable15 and as the number of observations is relatively small, the model
with four lags pushes the framework to its feasible limits.
As the model with two lags is the most stable one, all further robustness
14The idea of median impulse responses is borrowed from Huber and Fischer (2015).
15Multiple eigenvalues are above one in both models.
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Fig. 5 Impulse Responses of GDP Growth to an EONIA Shock. Note: The chart plots the responses
of GDP growth to a expansionary 25 basis point monetary policy shock in the form of a decrease of
the EONIA rate. The responses are divided by the shock itself and thus normalized, which yields a
percentage point representation on the y-axis. The solid blue line represents the median response along
the grey shaded area which covers the Bayesian credible interval between the 16th and 84th quantile. The
x-axis steps are monthly.
checks will be carried out with the baseline model. The third robustness
check changes the variable ordering of the Cholesky decomposition. Thus,
the assumptions around the second pillar of monetary policy strategy will
be loosened up a bit. In other words, the loan variables will now be ordered
below the shock variable. This would indicate that the ECB still observes
prices, output and the stress in financial markets before conducting further
policy decisions, however, these decisions will not be based on the outcome of
the Bank Lending Survey. Indeed, the loan variables are now defined to move
contemporaneously with the monetary policy shock. However, the findings
are virtually the same.
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Fig. 6 Robustness Check Impulse Responses. Note: The chart plots the median responses of all countries
for all available variables to a expansionary 25 basis point monetary policy shock. The responses are
divided by the shock itself and thus normalized. The solid blue line represents the median response along
the grey shaded area which covers the Bayesian credible interval between the 16th and 84th quantile for
the base model. The green and purple line are the base models with 3 and 4 lags respectively. The orange
dot-dash line is based on a changed Cholesky ordering. The yellow line with the long dashes uses the
EONIA-MRO spread as shock variable. The x-axis steps are monthly.
In the final test the EONIA rate will be exchanged for the spread between
the MRO and the EONIA rate. The ECB increased the demand and supply
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for liquidity with the deployed fixed-rate full allotment, which in turn exerted
a downward pressure on the EONIA rate. The ongoing provision of money
led to excess liquidity, which further opened the spread between the main
policy rate and the overnight index. These effects can be especially observed
during the 3-year longer-term refinancing operations (Albertazzi et al., 2016;
Boeckx et al., 2017; Lenza et al., 2010). Thus, the spread should be a ’pure’
indicator of credit enhancing policies. Re-estimating the model with this
shock variable yields nearly the same results as in the base model, with
responses of the loan variables and GDP growth being a bit lower.
5 Conclusion
With the tails of the financial crisis still being noticeable, this paper analysis
the bank lending channel via the effects of an unconventional monetary policy
shock. The sample period covers the start of the crisis till the latest available
time point and thus includes all policy measures taken by the ECB. However,
this paper focuses on the credit enhancing policies which had a direct effect
on the available liquidity to banks. The findings show that the enhanced
credit support policies undertaken by the ECB helped to circumvent the
impaired transmission channels via new channels to stimulate bank lending
and thus output.
The main task for the analysis of the channel is the identification of a
suitable policy variable and the developments of loan demand and supply.
The former is identified via the EONIA rate, as this rate has shown to posses
the properties needed to reflect the credit enhancing policies taken by the
ECB. The disentanglement of loan demand and supply is achieved via the
usage of the Bank Lending Survey. This rich database delivers the needed
variables for a stringent separation of demand and supply.
The paper contributes to the literature via a separation of the usual ag-
gregated responses into country-level responses and thus uncovering a north-
south disparity between Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Greece, Por-
tugal, Spain. The results suggest that the bank lending channel indeed is
operational throughout the sample period. The increased liquidity by the
ECB helped foster output growth as a second round effect. Moreover, a clear
indication of country-specific effects from an unified unconventional monetary
policy shock can be observed. In a low interest environment, the positive re-
sponses of loan supply vary between 2% to 4% between the countries. With
Germany, Greece and Italy being a bit more apprehensive regarding their
lending conditions as the other countries. Same holds true for the responses
of loan demand, with five out of seven countries displaying a positive effect
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between 2% to 3%. The findings for GDP growth are inline with the predic-
tion of the bank lending channel. An expansionary monetary policy shock
boosts output growth for several months. However, those results show a clear
center-periphery-relationship, but the disparity can only be observed for the
macroeconomic variable. This provides evidence that the banking sector and
financial markets are highly interconnected and that banks can spread their
risk across borders. However, macroeconomic policies are country-specific
and thus center-periphery-relationships are easier to observe.
Implications from this paper can be drawn regarding theory and policy.
In general, the findings corroborate the existing literature in highlighting the
functionality of the bank lending channel during crisis periods. Furthermore
confirming that stressed countries had a difficult time increasing the credit
availability to the economy. This in turn would explain the hampered effects
on GDP growth. In order to abolish such a north-south-disparity, fiscal policy
is needed to create a situation in which companies are in a position where
they can invest and thus boost economic activity. Summarizing, the one size
fits all approach of the ECB helped all countries, in one way or another,
to foster loan supply and partly output growth. However, unconventional
monetary policy in a single-currency union with such heterogeneous countries
also has its boundaries. This is the point were programs such as the "Europe
2020" strategy and the "Stability and Growth Pact" come into play. These
endeavors will help to further strengthen the euro area economy via increased
employment, production and thus output.
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Fig. 7 Impulse Responses of HICP to an EONIA Shock. Note: The chart plots the responses of the
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) to a expansionary 25 basis point monetary policy shock
in the form of a decrease of the EONIA rate. The responses are divided by the shock itself and thus
normalized, which yields a percentage point representation on the y-axis. The solid blue line represents
the median response along the grey shaded area which covers the Bayesian credible interval between the
16th and 84th quantile. The x-axis steps are monthly.
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Fig. 8 Impulse Responses of CISS to an EONIA Shock. Note: The chart plots the responses of the
Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) to a expansionary 25 basis point monetary policy shock
in the form of a decrease of the EONIA rate. The responses are divided by the shock itself and thus
normalized, which yields a percentage point representation on the y-axis. The solid blue line represents
the median response along the grey shaded area which covers the Bayesian credible interval between the
16th and 84th quantile. The x-axis steps are monthly.
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Fig. 9 Impulse Responses of Gov. Bond Yields to an EONIA Shock. Note: The chart plots the responses
of the long-term government bond yields to a expansionary 25 basis point monetary policy shock in the
form of a decrease of the EONIA rate. The responses are divided by the shock itself and thus normalized,
which yields a percentage point representation on the y-axis. The solid blue line represents the median
response along the grey shaded area which covers the Bayesian credible interval between the 16th and
84th quantile. The x-axis steps are monthly.
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Fig. 10 Impulse Responses of MFI Deposits to an EONIA Shock. Note: The chart plots the responses
of vis-a-vis deposits of monetary financial institution (MFI) to a expansionary 25 basis point monetary
policy shock in the form of a decrease of the EONIA rate. The responses are divided by the shock itself
and thus normalized, which yields a percentage point representation on the y-axis. The solid blue line
represents the median response along the grey shaded area which covers the Bayesian credible interval
between the 16th and 84th quantile. The x-axis steps are monthly.
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Fig. 11 Impulse Responses of MRO rate and Euro Stoxx to an EONIA Shock. Note: The chart plots the
responses of the main refinancing operations (MRO) rate and the Euro Stoxx index to a expansionary
25 basis point monetary policy shock in the form of a decrease of the EONIA rate. The responses are
divided by the shock itself and thus normalized, which yields a percentage point representation on the
y-axis. The solid blue line represents the median response along the grey shaded area which covers the
Bayesian credible interval between the 16th and 84th quantile. The x-axis steps are monthly.
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